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I. INTRODUCTION
The past fifteen years have witnessed a dramatic transformation in the
fundamental nature of labor-management relations. Under traditional
management philosophy, workers were expected to "check their brains at the
door" when they arrived at work in the morning. The ineluctable logic of the
division of labor demanded that workers would use their backs, while
managers would use their brains-to think of ways to get the work
accomplished more efficiently. By the late 1970s, however, many corporate
executives began to discover that the traditional way of organizing work was
wasting one of their greatest assets: the creative minds of their workers.
Throughout the next decade, therefore, increasing numbers of corporate
managers adopted "employee involvement" or "participatory management"
programs such as quality circles' in an effort to harness this heretofore wasted
resource. In the process, they expected to enhance their firms' productivity,
improve the quality of the products or services they produced, and increase the
job satisfaction of their workers.
These innovative efforts are in jeopardy because of the anticompany union
provision of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act). Intended to
eliminate a particularly egregious source of labor strife-the sham worker
representation organizations known as "company unions"-this provision was
broadly drafted in order to prohibit all the devices employers had used to give
their employees the illusion of representation and thereby forestall union
organizing drives. Unfortunately, the language of the provision is also broad
enough to capture many bona fide employee involvement organizations.
Since the late 1970s, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the
Board) has incrementally attempted to construe the Act's provisions to separate
the participatory management sheep from the company union goats. In its
decision in Electromation, Inc.2 the Board was expected to set the matter
straight. Its success in that effort is the focus of this Note.
* This Note received the 1994 Donald S. Teller Memorial Award as the second year
writing that contributed most significantly to the Ohio State Law Journal.
I See infra part HI.B.1.
2 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992). The Board's decision was upheld in Electromation, Inc. v.
NLRB, Nos. 92-4129 and 93-1169, 1994 WL 502513 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
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Part II will discuss the historical background of the NLRA's anticompany
union provision and the evolution of participatory management, give a brief
description of the types of employee involvement programs, and examine their
status under the Act before Electromation. Part m will look at the Board's
decision in Electromation, focus on that decision's effects on the statutory
definition of a labor organization, and address the Board's subsequent effort to
refine its definition of a labor organization in DuPont.3 Part IV will examine
the state of the law after DuPont, analyze the shortcomings of the Board's
current interpretation, and discuss two areas in which a new interpretation of
the statute's language could benefit participatory management. Finally, Part V
will conclude that the statutory definition of a labor organization should be
interpreted to require a finding that an employee group acted in a representative
capacity before an employer can be found to have committed an unfair labor
practice by assisting it.
II. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT UNDER THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
A. The Historical Background
At the time the 1935 National Labor Relations Act4 was written, workplace
"cooperation" between management and labor most often took the form of
company unions.5 Employers offered these in-house, employer-created
organizations to their workers "as an alternative either to dealing with
management individually or through a trade union." 6 Although purported to
represent the workers' interests, 7 company unions rarely reached bilateral
agreements with their sponsoring employers.8 They did, however, retard the
self-organization of workers into autonomous trade and industrial unions, in
large measure by providing the appearance of collective action without the
3 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
5 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 634,
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPANY UNIONS 3 (1935); see generaly Thomas C. Kohler, Models
of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REv.
499, 518-30 (1986) (discussing the history of the company union movement).
6 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 4.
7 See id.
8 See id. at 155. Only about 5 % of the company unions studied by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics in 1935 had obtained collective agreements containing provisions regarding wages,
hours, or working conditions. Id. at 154-55.
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substance. 9
Enacted as a key element of the Roosevelt Administration's New Deal
response to the economic depression of the 1930s,10 the NLRA sought to
encourage collective bargaining as a means of preventing strikes and other
forms of industrial unrest, thereby removing the burdens to commerce they
cause." At the heart of the Act were three rights guaranteed to workers: the
right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to engage in
peaceful strikes and picketing. 12 These rights were to be implemented and
enforced by a number of provisions, of which the most important-at least in
the eyes of Senator Wagner, the NLRA's sponsor-was the one that prevented
employers from dominating or interfering with labor organizations. 13
9 See Kohler, supra note 5, at 530.
10 See ARCHImALD Cox, ET AL., LABOR LAW 84-86 (1991); see also 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1988).
11 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Section 1 of the original National Labor Relations Act
of 1935 (the Wagner Act) laid the blame for strikes and industrial unrest squarely upon the
doorstep of employers: "The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and
the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and
other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which... burdenI or obstructI commerce ...."
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)). The 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Act recognized that
"certain practices by some labor organizations" also burdened the free flow of commerce
"through strikes or other forms of industrial unrest." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
Some commentators have argued that the NLRA's encouragement of collective
bargaining implies that Congress adopted an adversarial model of labor relations as federal
policy. See, e.g., Kohler, supra note 5; Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial
System An Argunent Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1662, 1663 (1983) [hereinafter Harvard Note]. A better
view is that the central concern of the NLRA-and of federal labor policy in general-is to
protect the free flow of commerce by reducing incitements to industrial unrest. As one
writer noted, "[w]hile Congress envisioned that an adversary model might help achieve
those ends, it did not preclude cooperation between workers and management, provided
that the rights of all parties are preserved." Note, Participatory Management Under Sections
2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1736, 1742 n.38
(1985) [hereinafter Michigan Note]. Had Congress intended to adopt a purely adversarial
model of labor relations, it would not have crafted the language of § 2(5) to permit
employee organizations to deal with their employers over subjects other than those it
enumerated in the section: it would simply have prohibited such dealings altogether. See
infra note 14.
12 See Cox, supra note 10, at 85.
13 See Willam B. Gould IV, Reflections on Workers' Participation, Influence, and
Powersharing: The Future of Industrial Relations, 58 U. CQN. L. REv. 381, 384 (1989). At
the time, Senator Wagner believed that
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Within a few years, it was apparent that this key provision-section
8(a)(2)14-had achieved its purpose. In 1935 approximately 2.5 million
workers were members of company unions-about three-fifths as many as
belonged to worker-organized trade and industrial unions.1 5 During the
following years, through vigorous enforcement of the law by the NLRB and
the Supreme Court,16 company unions were "obliterated." 17 Meanwhile, with
[tihe greatest obstacles to collective bargaining are employer-dominated unions,
which have multiplied with amazing rapidity since the enactment of [the National
Industrial Recovery Act]. Such a union makes a sham of equal bargaining power ....
[O]nly representatives who are not subservient to the employer with whom they
deal can act freely in the interest of employees....
For these reasons the very first step toward genuine collective bargaining is the
abolition of the employer dominated union ....
78 CONG. REC. 3443, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935, at 15-16 (1985) [hereinafter 1 NLRB] (emphasis added).
14 In pertinent part, § 8(a)(2) provides that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
... to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it... [but] an
employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with
him during working hours without loss of time or pay ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
The term "labor organization," in turn, was broadly defined to include "any
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, or
dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
Section 8 of the NLRA deals with unfair labor practices. In the original Wagner Act,
the subsection prohibiting company unions was numbered 8(2). The subsequent Taft-Hartley
Amendments added union unfair labor practices to the list, in § 8(b), and assigned employer
unfair labor practices to § 8(a). For the sake of clarity, I have used the Taft-Hartley
numbering scheme throughout this Note.
15 See Kohler, supra note 5, at 530.
16 See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 994 (1992), enforced, Nos. 92-4129
and 93-1169, 1994 WL 502513 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994). "After Congress passed the Act
in 1935, a first order of business for the Board, backed by the Supreme Court, was to weed
out employer-dominated organizations." Id.
17 See Michigan Note, supra note 11, at 1743 n.42 (quoting Daniel Nelson, The
Company Union Movement, 1900-1937: A Reexamination, 56 Bus. HIST. REv. 335, 335
(1982)).
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the aid and encouragement of the federal government, membership in trade and
industrial unions increased rapidly, so that by 1947 nearly 15 million workers
were union members.18
Under the protection of the NLRA, and riding on the swell of the surging
post-World War II American economy, labor unions were able to negotiate
significant benefits for their members.' 9 These gains came at a cost, however:
an average of 370 major strikes, involving more than 1.5 million workers, took
place each year from 1947 to 1957.20 As authors Barry and Irving Bluestone
observed, "the fundamental nature of the relationship between management and
labor was notably adversarial." 21 For the first four decades of the NLRA's
existence this fact posed no significant problems to the economy as a whole, for
it was strong enough to absorb the cost of strikes and overcome the
inefficiencies inherent in a system of adversarial labor-management relations.
By the 1970s, however, as it became apparent that the traditional adversarial
system was hurting American economic competitiveness, managers began to
experiment with other approaches.
B. The Evolution of Cooperative Relations
Historically, American business had operated under the time-honored
principle of the division of labor. This theory was based on the truism-long
known, but first applied systematically during the Industrial Revolution-that
"when a workman spends every day on the same detail, the finished article is
produced more easily, quickly, and economically." 22 But by the late 1970s,
18 See Cox, supra note 10, at 92.
19 See BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE 33-59
(1992). In addition to wage increases, what the authors call the "traditional workplace
contract" came to include such standard features as a productivity-based Annual
Improvement Factor; cost-of-living adjustments to offset the effects of inflation; job-related
benefits such as pensions, paid holidays, vacations, and medical insurance; seniority-based
layoffs, recalls, and transfers; negotiated conditions of work and work rules; and grievance
procedures (culminating in arbitration) to resolve contract disputes. Id. at 43-50.
20 Id. at 41. This amount of labor unrest is all the more significant when one considers
that the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA prohibited unions from using some
economic weapons-most notably the secondary boycott-that they had previously
employed to great effect. See Cox, supra note 10, at 92-97.
21 BLUEsTONE, supra note 19, at 41.
22 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 555 (George Lawrence trans.,
Harper & Row 1988) (1848). De Tocqueville further observed that
[w]hen a workman is constantly and exclusively engaged in making one object, he
ends by performing this work with singular dexterity. But at the same time, he loses the
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foreign competition,23 rapid technological change, 24 and other factors provided
a strong impetus to change the workplace relationship. Managers began to
recognize that their workers could also be thinkers; that "[i]nstead of only a
few people being paid to think and the rest being paid for their bodies from the
neck down, everyone's ideas [were] needed to work on developing and
applying new technology and on improving existing methods and approaches to
remain competitive." 25 To tap this resource, companies began to institute a
wide array of employee involvement programs 26 such as quality circles, quality
of work life projects, and total quality management programs. These programs
gave groups of hourly workers the opportunity to solve problems and make
general faculty of applying his mind to the way he is working. Every day he becomes
more adroit and less industrious, and one may say that in his case the man is degraded
as the workman improves.
Id.
The principle found its fullest and most influential expression in Frederick Winslow
Taylor's 1911 book Scientific Management. Taylor, who believed that the use of scientific
methods to break down every craft into simple, easily learned tasks would result in work
that was easier for the workers-and more efficient and profitable for the employer-
outlined in his book a series of principles by which enterprises should be managed. One of
these principles involved the use of a centralized planning department. This department
would unquestionably decrease "the cost of production... by separating the planning and
the brain work as much as possible from the manual labor." See FREDERICK WINSLOW
TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMETr 121 (Harper & Brothers 1947) (1911). Taylor realized
that "there [were] many people who [would] disapprove of the whole scheme of a planning
department to do the thinking for the men ... on the ground that this does not tend to
promote independence, self-reliance, and originality in the individual." Id. at 146. Such
people, Taylor believed, "must take exception to the whole trend of modem industrial
development." Id.
23 Michael Schuster, Problems and Opportunities in Implementing Cooperative Union-
Management Programs, in INDUSTRIAL REL. RES. ASSN SERIES PROC. OF THE THRTY-
FjFrH ANN. MEETING 189, 189 (Barbara D. Dennis ed., 1983).
24 Neil DeKoker, Labor-Management Relations for Survival, in INDUSTRIAL REL. RES.
ASS'NPROC. OFTHE 1985 SPRnNGMEETING 576, 576 (Barbara D. Dennis ed., 1985).
25 Id.
26 1 use this generic term to encompass such diverse programs as quality circles (QCs),
quality of work life projects (QWL), and total quality management (TQM). Though they
differ in their approach to the subject, they all have a common basis: they are changes in
management structure designed to (among other things) elicit greater worker interest and
involvement in their jobs, to provide a means for using their creativity, and thereby to
improve productivity and product or service quality. See, e.g., HARRY KATZAN, JR.,
QuALrrY CIRCLE MANAGEMENT 28-29 (1989); Schuster, supra note 23, at 189.
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decisions that once were exclusively within the realm of management. 27
1. How Employee Involvement Programs Function
The simplest program-and the first to be adopted on a widespread basis-
was the "quality circle." 28 An individual quality circle typically consists of six
to twelve members, usually from the same work unit, who meet regularly on a
voluntary basis to identify product quality problems, develop solutions to those
problems, and make recommendations to management.29 The circle operates
under the general guidance of a circle leader-frequently the group's
supervisor-who is responsible for the circle's operation and sets its agenda.30
Decisions within the circle as to the cause of a problem and the solution the
group will recommend may be made by vote or by consensus. 31
Quality of work life (QWL) projects focus primarily on worker
satisfaction, rather than productivity or product quality. 3 2 The QWL
27 Employee involvement programs like these and others have been adopted by many
U.S. companies. According to one recent estimate, approximately 35,000 companies have
adopted some form of employee involvement, in which about nine million employees are
believed to participate. See John W. Bowers, Section 8(a)(2) and Paricipative
Management: An Argmnentfor Judicial and Legislative Crange in a Modem Worlqlace, 26
VAL. U. L. REV. 525, 526 n.3 (1992). In another recent study-a random survey of nearly
200 unionized companies-19% had begun QWL-type plans. See BLUESTONE, supra note
19, at 163. A 1983 survey of approximately 400 large companies revealed that 56 % of their
unionized operations had established some type of quality circle program. Id.
28 Schuster, supra note 23, at 189. Though once used almost exclusively in Japan,
quality circles are now a commonly used management technique in the United States as
well. As many will hasten to add, the principles underlying quality circles and total quality
management programs were developed by American researchers, most notably the late Dr.
W. Edwards Deming, during the 1940s. See, e.g., Scott McIntyre, Living with TQM,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1994, at 8 (letter to the editor); Michigan Note, supra note 11, at 1740
n.24.
Deming's principles were relatively unknown (and untried) in the United States until
the late 1970s; they were commonly used in Japanese industry by the 1950s. See THOMAS
H. BERRY, MANAGING THE TOTAL QuALiTY TRANSFORMATION 41 (1991).
29 See KATZAN, supra note 26, at 21-23. Both the leader and the circle members
receive training in specialized problem-identification and problem-solving techniques. Id. at
46. Apart from the addition of a quality circle facilitator, who is responsible for the
operation of the circle program throughout the plant, no changes need be made to the
existing organizational structure for the program to be successful. Id. at 24-25.
30 Id. at 43-45.
31 Id. at 83-84, 129-30.
32 See Michigan Note, supra note 11, at 1739-40. "Quality of work life" refers to a
variety of approaches intended to make workers' jobs more meaningful and satisfying. See
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approaches range from cafeteria improvements and work-rule changes to more
fundamental changes such as flexible work hours, self-directed work teams,33
and job redesigning and restructuring. 34
Total quality management (TQM) programs represent a complete top-down
transformation of a corporation's structure and culture.35 In a sense, a TQM
program is like a quality circle program writ large:36 a quality improvement
(QI) team will identify a quality problem that is measurable, and for which data
are available;37 analyze the problem to determine its root cause(s);38 agree
Schuster, supra note 23, at 191; Michigan Note, supra note 11, at 1739. Worker
satisfaction, in turn, is expected to lead to a higher quality product at a lower cost. See
Michigan Note, supra note 11, at 1739.
33 Self-directed work teams are an innovation with particular significance for labor-
management relations. In plants where they are used, each team is assigned the
responsibility for performing a major operational function, such as the assembly and testing
of diesel engines. The teams are given considerable autonomy to determine how the
function is to be completed. For example, a team may manage the day-to-day production
process, interview and hire job applicants drawn from a pool chosen by management,
resolve grievances, impose discipline on other team members, set production and material
flow schedules, prepare budgets and monitor costs, and even order parts from vendors. To
implement this fundamental change in the way work is structured-particularly when it
takes place in a union setting-employers often rely on a joint worker-management
committee to coordinate the operation of the program and to provide a forum for workers
and managers to discuss and resolve any problems that may arise. See Kohler, supra note 5,
at 507-09; Michigan Note, supra note 11, at 1739-41.
34 Schuster, supra note 23, at 191.
35 Successful implementation of TQM is predicated upon a corporate culture that
rewards quality (as distinct from quantity) and upon a workforce that is satisfied with its
working conditions, pay, benefits, supervision, performance appraisal system, and
communications within the company. See BERRY, supra note 28, at 22. As one writer
observed, "[i]f... the employee population has a sour attitude toward management and the
company, then gaining their active and enthusiastic participation in TQM will be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, without first improving the areas of principal concern." Id.
36 TQM differs from quality circles in several important respects, however. While
quality circles generally consist of several volunteering hourly employees who perform
related job tasks, QI team members are selected by management, may come from any level
in the organization, and often represent a variety of departments and functions. Membership
on the team is mandatory, and the team leader is assigned by management. Furthermore,
the problem or project upon which the team will work is often selected by management, is
always approved by management, and must relate to a business priority. Id. at 4. "Unit-
level quality" groups, which resemble traditional quality circles, still exist at the lowest rung
of the TQM organizational ladder. Id. at 93-94.
37 Id. at 58-59.
38 Id. at 65-66.
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upon a solution and draft an implementation plan for management approval; 39
and then monitor the effects of the change, meanwhile recommending further
changes as necessary.40
2. Employee Involvement Programs Run the Risk
of Violating Section 8(a)(2)
Most employee involvement programs appear to fit within the NLRA's
definition of a "labor organization. "41 They are organizations in which
employees participate; they interact with the management structure of their
sponsoring corporations in a variety of ways; and their activities may have a
direct or indirect effect upon grievances, hours of employment, and especially
"conditions of work."42 If an employee involvement group is a labor
organization, then an employer that "dominates" it, "interferes" with its
formation or administration, or contributes financial or other support to it, may
be found to have violated section 8(a)(2) of the Act.43 In fact, because
employee involvement programs are created by management as management
tools to solve management problems, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
employers dominate them.44
Although few such programs have been the target of unfair labor practice
39 Id. at 67-68.
40 Id. at 68-70. Statistical process control techniques are used to monitor the change's
effects.
41 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 901 (1993) (Devaney,
concurring) (observing that committees formed as management tools to solve management
problems will almost invariably be "dominated" by the employer). An employer commits
an unfair labor practice by dominating or interfering with a labor organization, or by
contributing financial or other support to it. See supra note 14; see infra part IH.B.1. The
NLRB and most courts interpret section 8(a)(2) to forbid any employer involvement in the
activities of labor organizations. See Michigan Note, supra note 11, at 1748. This
interpretation of employer domination plainly includes management formation and financing
of labor organizations. Thus, if a quality circle is found to be a statutory labor organization,
many aspects of the relationship between it and management described in Part l.B. 1 could
result in unfair labor practice charges.
Other courts use an "actual domination" test to see whether an employer's involvement
has restricted employees' "free choice" of an independent bargaining representative,
distinguishing employer "cooperation" from prohibited "support." See Chicago Rawhide
Mfg. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1955).
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complaints, 45 the possibility that they may be prohibited by the NLRA46 has
prompted congressional interest in amending the Act to permit their use.47 A
tremendous amount of attention was generated, therefore, when the NLRB
announced that it would take the unusual step of hearing oral arguments48 in
Electromation, Inc.,a9 a case involving committees of workers organized by
45 Out of over 9300 complaints issued by the NLRB's Office of General Counsel over
the three year period between fiscal year 1990 and fiscal year 1992, only 20 (0.21%)
involved allegations of employer violations of § 8(a)(2). See E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 899 n.4 (Devaney, concurring).
46 See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 27, at 538-39; Kohler, supra note 5, at 536.
47 S. 699, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1993) would have amended § 8(a)(2) to exclude
from its coverage employee groups established to "discuss matters of mutual interest" when
those groups do not "have, claim, or seek authority to enter into collective bargaining
agreements with the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements
between the employer and any labor organization." 139 CONG. REC. S4014 (daily ed. Mar.
30, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum).
Similar legislation, proposed in 1991 (prior to Electronation), would have specifically
exempted quality circles and joint worker-management production teams from the reach of
§ 8(a)(2). See Bowers, supra note 27, at 526 n.8.
48 Board Member Clifford Oviatt explained that "the [NLRB's] first mistake was the
agreement among the members to slate the case for oral argument, thereby signaling the
press and the public that a major change in the law was in the offing." Labor Lmvyers Say
Electromation Less Inportant tun Once Pre&cted, 31 GOv'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. 167,
168 (1993). Furthermore,
Oviatt explained that other members were keen to schedule argument on a "hot topic,"
and he relented as a courtesy to his colleagues even though he would have preferred to
affirm the administrative law judge's holding with a short-form ruling. "I just think it
was a bad vehicle" to discuss employee involvement committees and to "get everybody
stirred up"....
Id.
49 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, Nos. 92-4129 and 93-1169, 1994 WL 502513
(7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994). See supra note 48 regarding the way in which Electromation first
gained its exceptional status. Even before the decision was released, NLRB Chairman James
Stephens was
known to have argued that the decision should be as narrow as possible because the
circumstances in the ... case were not strong enough to use to break new legal ground.
Sources said the other board members agreed. But even with a narrow ruling, the...
decision [would] serve as the lead case for several other complaints working their way
through the NLRB legal process.
Frank Swoboda, Worker Programs Face NLRB Chullenge, WAsH. PosT, Dec. 15, 1992, at
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their employer-in response to employee complaints-to develop alternatives to
the company's previously announced changes to its attendance bonus policy.50
HI. FLECrROMATION, INC.: A RELUCTANT LANDMARK
Electromation, Inc., an Elkhart, Indiana nonunion manufacturer of small
electrical and electronic components for the automobile industry,51 found itself
in financial trouble in late 1988.52 In order to cut expenses, Electromation's
management decided to alter its employee attendance bonus policy, and to
provide a year-end lump-sum payment to employees instead of giving them a
wage increase. 53 Displeased by these changes, sixty-eight employees petitioned
the company's management to change the altered attendance policy.5 4 In
response, the company president met twice with a group of randomly chosen
employees,55 first to discuss the problem issues (including wages, bonuses,
incentive pay, attendance programs, and leave policy) and then to propose the
creation of joint worker-management "action committees" to "meet and try to
come up with ways to resolve these problems." 56
C1, C2.50 Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 990-91.
51 Id. at 1016.
52 Id. at 990.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 During 1988, the company had held several similar meetings with other groups of
employees. Like the "action committees," these groups were randomrdy selected from the
top and bottom halves of the company seniority list. See id. at 1016.
56 Id. at 991. As Electromation's president testified, if the committees "came up with
solutions that . .. [management] believed were within budget concerns and they generally
felt would be acceptable to the employees, [then the company] would implement [those]
suggestions or proposals." Id. (emphasis added). Although the workers were initially not
receptive to the idea, the president explained that financial problems prevented them from
"put[tingJ things back the way they were." Id. Eventually the employees agreed that the
action committee concept was preferable to simply acquiescing in the changes
Electromation had already made. On the day after the second meeting, the company posted
a memorandum directed to all its employees that announced the formation of five action
committees (designated as Absenteeism/Infractions, No Smoking Policy, Communication
Network, Pay Progression for Premium Positions, and Attendance Bonus Program) and
posted sign-up sheets for each. Id.
The company expected that the employee members of all the committees would talk
with other employees in the plant, get their ideas, and be available so that "'anyone [who]
wanted to know what was going on... could go to [them].'" Id. At the first meeting of the
Attendance Bonus committee, the members were informed that they "'were supposed to go
out amongst the other employees and find out what kind of ideas they had concerning a
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Shortly after the committees began to meet, Teamsters Local 1049 made a
demand to the company for recognition, 57 and subsequently filed an election
petition with the NLRB's Regional Director.58 Later, during the election
campaign, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Regional
Director, alleging that Electromation's action committees violated sections
8(a)(2) and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 59 Seven months later, an administrative law
judge found merit in the union's unfair labor practice charge, decided that
Electromation had dominated and assisted the action committees in violation of
sections 8(a)(2) and 8(a)(1) of the Act, and issued a recommended order
directing Electromation to disband the committees. 60 In response to the
company's exceptions, the NLRB scheduled the case for oral argument. 61
A. The Board's Decision
Given the facts of the case, 62 the NLRB had little trouble deciding that
Electromation had violated sections 8(a)(2) and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA when it
good attendance program .... '" Id. at 991 n.7. The Attendance Bonus committee
developed a proposal that was rejected by the company's controller, himself a member of
the committee, because it was too expensive. The employees subsequently developed a
second proposal which the controller deemed to be fiscally sound. Id. at 991-92.
57 Id. at 991. The administrative law judge found no evidence to indicate that the
company was aware of the union's organizing effort until the union demanded recognition.
Id. at 1018. At the next scheduled meeting of each action committee, Electromation's
committee coordinator informed the members that management could no longer participate
in the committee meetings, but that the employee members could continue to meet if they
wished. The Absenteeismllnfraction and Communication Network committees decided to
continue to meet; the Pay Progression committee disbanded; and the Attendance Bonus
committee decided to first write up the proposal the controller had approved and then to
disband. Id. at 991. The committee never submitted the proposal to the company's president
because the union's election campaign had intervened. Id. at 922.
58 Id. at 1015.
59 Id. On March 31, 1989, the representation election was held. The union lost, 95 to
82. Id.
60 See id. at 1019. The judge also found the company's unfair labor practice had
interfered with the election and recommended that the result be set aside. Id.
61 Id. at 990.
62 As Board Chairman James Stephens, the opinion's author, later told a congressional
panel, the case involved "a 'fairly garden-variety' violation" of the NLRA. NLRB Otaiman
Calls Electromation a 'Fairly Garden-Variety' Violation, 31 GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP.
388, 388 (1993). Because the testimony made it clear that Electromation had established the
committees specifically to represent its employees in discussions about working conditions,
the General Counsel was readily able to establish all the elements of the unfair labor
practice charge. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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responded to its employees' complaints by "devising and imposing on the
employees an organized Committee mechanism composed of managers and
employees instructed to 'represent' fellow employees." 63 Although the "garden
variety" nature of the case did not require a detailed opinion, the Board
nonetheless discussed at length the statutory definition of a labor organization,
the legislative history of the Act's prohibition of company unions, and the
elements of the section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice charge.This discussion-
although mostly dicta64-does indicate how the NLRB may rule in future,
closer cases. 65
63 Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 998. The Board's opinion went on to state that
"[tihe purpose of the Action Committees was... not to enable management and employees
to cooperate to improve 'quality' or 'efficiency,' but to create in employees the impression
that their disagreements with management had been resolved bilaterally." Id.
64 The NLRB realized-belatedly, it seems-that the facts in Electromation made the
case a bad vehicle for establishing new policy. See supra notes 48-49. At times the Board
attempted to downplay the significance of the case, see supra notes 48 and 62, but it had
already attracted congressional attention. See 138 CONG. REc. H2205 (daily ed. Apr. 1,
1992) (statement of Rep. Gunderson) (noting that Electromation "will probably be one of
the most important rulings ever" by the NLRB, and observing that the case had been
pending before the Board for two years); see also 138 CoNG. REC. H2206 (daily ed. Apr.
1, 1992) (statement of Rep. Ritter) (noting the second anniversary of the administrative law
judge's decision in Electromation "that has put American competitiveness on ice"). Because
so much was expected from the case, the NLRB had to make the most of it-hence the
detailed treatment of legislative history and prior Board decisions in what should have been
a "garden variety" case.
65 Chairman Stephens's Board opinion and Member Devaney's concurring opinion
form the basis for my discussion in the following sections. Both of these members will
remain on the Board well into the Clinton Administration; therefore, their opinions are
likely to be influential upon the three new members President Clinton is entitled to appoint.
Chairman Stephens will be replaced as Chairman but is entitled to remain as a Member
until August 27, 1995. Member Devaney's appointment expires December 16, 1994.
When the NLRB exercises the authority given to it by the NLRA to make rules to
implement the Act's provisions, it almost invariably makes them in the context of individual
adjudications. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1988); see generally Cox, supra note 10, at 140-42
(discussing the NLRB's use of adjudication to formulate new doctrine); Merton C.
Bernstein, The NIBs Adjudication-Rule Making Dilema Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 573-74 (1970) (same). In approaching the decision in
Electromation it is worth noting that, as one commentator observed:
The advantages of adjudicatory lawmaking for an agency concerned with congressional
review are substantial. Adjudicatory lawmaking permits the agency to adopt rules
without clearly articulating its policies and their implications.... In leaving its doctrine
ambiguous, often seemingly restricted to the facts of a certain case, the Board can
legislate in controversial areas without giving critics a clear and final rule to attack.
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B. The Developing Definition of "Labor Organization"
1. "Dealing" as a Bilateral Mechanism
In order to establish a violation of section 8(a)(2), the General Counsel66
must first show that the entity that the employer allegedly dominated or
interfered with was a statutory labor organization. 67 Within section 2(5), the
Electromation majority agreed, were three elements: that the organization was
one in which employees participated; that it existed, at least in part, for the
purpose of "dealing with" an employer; and that those dealings concerned
"conditions of work" or one of the other subjects listed in section 2(5).68
"Dealing," as the Supreme Court had held, meant more than "bargaining
collectively," 69 but the lower limits of the term were left undefined. 70 In
Electromation, the NLRB attempted to establish these lower limits. Bearing in
mind that Congress intended to proscribe "employer interference in setting up
or running employee 'representation' groups [which] actually robbed
employees of the freedom to choose their own representatives," 71 the Board
advised that it viewed "dealing with" as "a bilateral mechanism involving
proposals from the employee committee ... coupled with real or apparent
Adjudication also gives the agency the opportunity to avoid clarifying the many
issues underlying the rule .... Indeed, it is a common criticism of the Board that it
often will announce such changes in an apparently innocuous manner, frequently
limiting its analytical discussion to one or two paragraphs ....
Perhaps the greatest advantage of adjudication in avoiding congressional scrutiny
is that it presents no firm and final resolution of a policy issue, but only an incremental
and ambiguous step in the gradual evolution of a general doctrine.
Robert L. Willmore, Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness,
89 YALEJL.. 982, 995-96 (1980).
66 The Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA established the office of the General
Counsel within the NLRB. The General Counsel (or the director of the NLRB region,
where such authority is delegated) has final authority to investigate unfair labor practice
charges, to decide whether a complaint should be issued, and to prosecute the complaint
(the party that filed the unfair labor practice charge may intervene and take part in the
proceedings). See generally Cox, supra note 10, at 107-11 (discussing the office of the
General Counsel).67 Electronation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 994.
68 Id.
69 NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 211 (1959).
70 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit made this observation in NLRB v.
Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 292 (6th Cir. 1982).
71 Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 993.
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consideration of those proposals by management." 72 The decision then singled
out some "unilateral" employee involvement practices, such as suggestion
boxes, "'brainstorming' groups or meetings, [and] analogous information
exchanges," which it did not consider to be "dealing." 73
2. Does the Act Require a Labor Organization
to be Representative?
If employee groups must act in a representational capacity in order to be
considered labor organizations, legitimate employee involvement programs are
not likely to violate section 8(a)(2).74 Though it expressly declined to reach this
issue,75 the Board's opinion nonetheless gave some indications that the Act's
legislative history and the NLRB's decisions might require it.
First, the Board's review of the legislative history of the Act76 revealed
72 Id. at 995 n.21. The Board did not reach the issue of whether such an employee
group must actually act as a representative of other employees in order to run afoul of the
Act. Id. at 994 n.20. Because the Board found that the action committees in question did act
in a representational capacity, the majority did not need to decide whether an employee
group that did not act as a representative of other employees could ever be a labor
organization. Id.
Because the primary purpose of most employee involvement groups is to generate
proposals, as discussed in Part II, if those proposals concerned any of the subjects listed in
§ 2(5), a Board decision following the Electromation holding would still find that the groups
deal with their employers, and therefore constitute labor organizations.
73 Id. at 995 n.21.
74 See infra part IV.C for a discussion of this point. Prior to Electromation, the NLRB
had already determined that the NLRA permitted some participatory management practices.
See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
75 See Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 994 n.20.
76 The Board reviewed the NLRA's history in order to determine just what activity
Congress intended to prohibit when it enacted § 8(a)(2). Id. at 992-94. Specifically, the
Board attempted to determine what Congress meant by "representation" as it appears in the
phrase "employee representation committee or plan." This phrase appears in § 2(5) as part
of the description of types of organizations in which employees might participate. Id. at
992.
In essence, the Board concluded that although the section already reached "any
organization of any kind," employee representation committees-the most prevalent form of
company unions-might not be included within that language because they were only
"'loose organization[s] if you [could] call [them] organization[s] ....'" Id. at 993 (quoting
To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1934) (statement of Edwin E. Witte, Professor of
Economics), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 13, at 271). For this reason Congress
mentioned the committees specifically.
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one predominant theme: that the company unions that the NLRA sought to
prohibit were all sham representatives or agents of their worker members. 77
This theme of labor-organization-as-representative continued into the Board's
conclusions. Having examined the Act's pertinent legislative history, the Board
majority agreed that "Congress' goal was to preserve for employees the right to
choose their bargaining representative free from employer interference . "...-78
Second, in a continuation of its historical analysis, the Board emphasized
the representative character of a labor organization when it addressed its 1935
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, InC.7 9 decision-the Board's very first unfair
labor practice case, and one that the present-day Board considered to be
"entirely typical of the 'employee representation plans or committees'
77 For example, after noting that the elimination of employer-dominated labor
organizations was a vital goal of the Act, the Board quoted Senator Wagner's description of
this goal: "'the abolition of the employer dominated union as an agency for dealing with
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates, or hours of employment.'" Id. at 993 (quoting 78
CONG. REC. 3443, 3443 (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 13,
at 15-16) (emphasis added). Later, when it addressed Professor Edwin Witte's successful
attempt to expand the definition of labor organizations to include unorganized (but very
prevalent) "employee representation committees," the Board quoted Witte as describing the
committees as being "merely a method of electing representatives." Id. (quoting To Create
a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Conm. on Educ. and
Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1934) (statement of Edwin E. Witte, Professor of
Economics), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 13, at 271). Senator Wagner's explanation of
the expanded definition was then cited: "If, as employers insist, such 'plans'... are lawful
representatives of employees, then employer activity relative to them should clearly be
included [in the Act's prohibition]." Id. (quoting STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON EDUC. AND
LABOR, 74TH CONG., 1ST SESS., MEMORANDUM COMPARING S. 1958 wrrH S. 2926, at 22
(Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 13, at 1347). Finally, in addressing
the distinction between true employer interference with a labor organization and conduct
that would be considered "minimal," the Board noted Senator Wagner's test: "'[tihe
question is entirely one of fact and turns upon whether or not the employee organization is
entirely the agency of the workers ..... " Id. at 994 (quoting Labor Disputes Act: Hearings
on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935)
(statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 2489 (1985)).
78 Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 994 n.18 (emphasis added). Moreover, this
legislative history showed that Congress had found "that employer interference in setting up
or running employee 'representation' groups actually robbed employees of the freedom to
choose their own representatives." Id. at 993. Based on this finding, "Congress concluded
that ridding collective bargaining of employer-dominated organizations... would advance
the... Act's goal of eliminating industrial strife." Id.
79 1 N.L.R.B. 1, 51 (1935) (prohibiting Greyhound from interfering with its
employees' rights to "self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, [or] to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing").
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perceived as so pernicious by Senator Wagner and... Congress." 80 As the
Electromatlon Board described the case, Greyhound management "usurped
from the employees their protected right to a bargaining representative of their
own choosing when it set up and accorded recognition to a 'committee' that
was in no way an agent of the employees or loyal to their interests .... "81
Finally, by noting with approval its 1977 General Foods Corp.8 2 decision,
the Board signaled its agreement with that case's reasoning on the
representational aspect of section 2(5).83 For the purposes of the Board's
discussion, the key feature of General Foods was the fact that the self-directed
employee work groups in question performed essentially managerial functions84
such as job assignment, job rotation, and overtime scheduling, and so were not
labor organizations.85 But the administrative law judge's conclusions in that
case, which the Board adopted, also contained this important observation:
The essence of a labor organization, as this term has been construed by the
Board and the courts, is a group or a person which stands in an agency
relationship to a larger body on whose behalf it is called to act. When this
relationship does not exist, all that can come into being is a staff meeting or the
factory equivalent thereof.86
Although it is unclear whether the Board had this aspect of General
Foods in mind when it discussed the case, the NLRB's General Counsel,
giving a subsequent briefing on Electromation, emphasized that General
Foods was still good law and "stressed that an element of the definition of [a]
labor organization [was] that the employees on the committee act in a
representational capacity on behalf of other employees." 87
Taken together, Electromation and General Foods stand for the proposition
that employers may unilaterally delegate authority over traditionally
"managerial" functions to groups of employees.88 In addition to reaffirming the
80 Electrotation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 994 (discussing Greyhound Lines, 1 N.L.R.B. at 1).
81 Id.
82 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234-35 (1977) (finding that worker teams were not labor
organizations because, in large part, they were organized to promote workplace efficiency
and did not act as agents for the employees).
83 Electronw'on, 309 N.L.R.B. at 995 (discussing General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at
1232).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1001 (Devaney, concurring).
86 General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1234 (emphasis added).
87 Employee Involvement Little Changed by Electromation Ruling, Hunter Says, 31
Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. 623, 623 (1993).
88 See General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235 (noting the groups were performing
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important "managerial function" exception to section 2(5) set forth in General
Foods,89 the Board also observed that section 2(5) was not implicated when
management delegated the adjudication of grievances to groups of employees. 90
Finally, as Member Devaney observed in his concurring opinion, the Board's
1985 Sears, Roebuck and Co. 91 decision upheld the finding that an employee
"communications committee" was not a labor organization, even though some
of the matters it discussed could have had a direct effect on working conditions,
because "the purpose of the committee was to be a management tool intended
to increase company efficiency, rather than [to act as] an employee
representative or advocate." 92
"managerial functions ... flatly delegated to employees."); see also Electromation, 309
N.L.R.B. at 1002 (Devaney, concurring).
89 General Foods noted three ways in which the employee involvement groups in
question were not labor organizations. First, the entire bargaining unit was involved in the
employee involvement process, so there was no separate entity "set apart from the totality
of the bargaining unit which it has been called upon to represent." General Foods, 231
N.L.R.B. at 1234. Second, the groups did not stand "in an agency relationship to a larger
body on whose behalf it is called to act." Id. Third, the groups were performing
"managerial functions.., flatly delegated to employees." Id. at 1235.
90 See Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 995.
91 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 244 (1985) (finding that a communications committee was not a
labor organization because it was organized to promote workplace efficiency and did not act
as an employee representative).
92 Electromzation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1002 (Devaney, concurring) (citing Sears, 274
N.L.R.B. at 230). Member Devaney continued: "I am in wholehearted agreement with the
thrust of these cases, and I find in them guidelines for consideration of future cases
involving alleged violations of Section 8(a)(2)." Id. In pertinent part, the administrative law
judge deciding Sears held that:
In the instant case the communications committee discussed matters related to
work performance. Many of those matters could have a direct impact on working
conditions. The ease with which a technician could obtain parts could affect his working
condition .... However, the evidence in the record establishes that the
communications committee was used as a management tool that was intended to
increase company efficiency. The communications committee was not an employee
representative or advocate. The committee did not deal with the Company on behalf of
the employees. The employees on the committee were not selected by their fellow
employees and they did not represent their fellow employees. All of the employees, on
a rotation basis, were to participate in meetings with management to give input in order
to help solve management problems.
Sears, 274 N.L.R.B. at 244.
Although the employee committees were unmistakably intended to serve as agents of
the company, because they were "created by the Company for company purposes," the
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In citing these decisions, the Board majority and concurring opinions
confirmed that the principles they enunciated are still good law. The effects of
these decisions on the body of law that has been developed to define the
characteristics of statutory labor organizations, and the effect of
Electromation itself, were once again addressed by the Board in its May, 1993
DuPont decision. 93
C. DuPont: A Look at Employee Involvement in a Union Setting
At issue in DuPont was the legality under sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of
worker-management safety committees at six DuPont facilities. Also at issue
were the questions of whether the company had illegitimately bypassed the
union when it interacted with the committees-which would violate section
8(a)(5)94 of the Act-and whether the company violated section 8(a)(5) of the
Act when it held safety conferences with its employees. 95 The administrative
law judge found that DuPont had violated sections 8(a)(2) and 8(a)(5) in its
dealings with the committees, but had not violated the Act when it conducted
the safety conferences. The Board agreed, but "add[ed] rationale to his decision
... to provide guidance for those seeking to implement lawful cooperative
judge also considered management's refusal to discuss matters raised by employees that
related to wages and benefits to be significant. Id. at 243. If the committees had been
permitted to act on behalf of employees in this manner (i.e., to discuss wages and benefits),
they no longer would have been management tools performing delegated management
functions-unless the committees were also given the power to make the final decision upon
those matters. Cf. Mercy-Memorial Hosp. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1119-21 (1977)
(finding that a joint employee-management grievance committee, composed of four
employees and one manager, in which decisions on grievances were made by majority vote,
was not a statutory labor organization); General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235 (permitting
the "flat delegation" of managerial functions to groups of employees). In essence, these
decisions permit employee groups to discuss subjects listed in § 2(5) (i.e., grievances, as in
Mercy-Memorial Hospital) with management provided that the employee groups have the
final say. If the groups are not delegated the authority to make decisions--if they are mere
communications devices-they must refrain from dealing with management over § 2(5)
subjects. The mere existence of an agency relationship between the employee group and the
employer is not enough to exempt the group from the reach of § 2(5): where statutory
subjects are involved, the agent must also be delegated final decisionmaking authority.
93 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
94 Section 8(a)(5) provides, in pertinent part, that "lilt shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees .... 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
95 See DuPont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 893.
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programs between employees and management." 96
First, the Board clarified the position it articulated in Electromation on
employee committees dealing with an employer. Dealing, the Board
determined, "ordinarily entails a pattern or practice" in which a group of
employees makes proposals to management to which management would
respond, accepting or rejecting them "by word or deed." 97 If the group existed
for the purpose of making proposals to management, the element of dealing
would be present, even if no proposals had actually been made.98 Conversely,
if the group existed for some other purpose-such as developing a variety of
ideas for solving a particular problem ("brainstorming") or sharing information
with the employer-but did upon "isolated instances" make "ad hoe proposals
to management" that were followed by a management response, no element of
dealing would be found.99
Second, the Board explicitly approved of DuPont's practice, at its safety
conferences, of informing the employees involved that "bargainable issues"
could not be dealt with in the conference's discussion groups. 1°° By making
this "good-faith effort to separate out bargainable issues," and by making it
clear that such issues were within the scope of the union's duties, DuPont
prevented the conference group discussions from becoming unlawful bargaining
sessions.101 Furthermore, the company used the discussion groups as a means
of soliciting suggestions and ideas from its employees on the topic of
workplace safety, but it did not require the groups to decide on proposals to
improve safety conditions.102
Finally, because the Board found that the worker-management safety
committees had acted in a representative capacity, it did not need to reach the
issue of whether labor organization status under section 2(5) would exist in the
96 Id,
97 Id. at 894.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 894 n.7. Though the Board does not specify this in its opinion, § 2(5) also
requires that the proposals concern "grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, or conditions of work." See 29 U.S.C. § 2(5) (1988).100 See DuPont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 896-97.
101 Id. at 897. By law, workplace safety is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. Generally speaking, in the absence of a contractual provision or past practice
that dictated otherwise, DuPont would have had to bargain with the union before making
any changes affecting workplace safety. In this case, DuPont did not violate § 8(a)(5)
because it was not "directly dealing with its employees" over this mandatory subject of
bargaining. Id.
102 Id. By structuring the goals of the conference in this manner, DuPont did not end
up dealing with its workers. Id.
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absence of such a finding. 10 3
IV. THE STATE OF THE LAW AFrERDUPOwT
In both Electromation and DuPont, the Board attempted to carve out an
area in which employee involvement groups could operate without running
afoul of the Act's company union prohibition. Some employee involvement
practices are clearly included within the "safe havens" the Board described;
others appear to be protected by earlier decisions that the Board reaffirmed. But
by refusing to reach a decision on whether groups would have to be
representative of workers before they could be considered labor organizations,
the Board has left the status of most employee involvement practices in limbo.
A. "Safe Havens" and Others that Might Be Safe
As DuPont makes clear, when employers use brainstorming groups to
generate a number of problem-solving ideas or use communication groups to
obtain information from employees, the element of dealing required by statute
is missing because the process is purely unilateral. 10 4 Ideas and information
flow upward from workers to management, but the workers have not
developed a specific proposal and do not expect a specific response. Such
activity is clearly permitted by the Board. 105 So, too, is an employer's use of a
suggestion box to solicit proposals from individual employees-but not from
groups. 106
103 Id. at 894 n.7. DuPont believed that the committees had not acted in a
representational capacity. It urged the Board to adopt a subjective standard, arguing that the
committees could not be found to be labor organizations in the absence of testimony by
nonparticipating employees showing that "the composition and functioning of the
committee[s] led [them] to believe that the employee members were there to represent
[their] interests." Id.
The Board might have used this opportunity to summarily reject the idea that an
employee group must be representative in order to be a labor organization, but it did not.
Instead, it rejected the proffered subjective standard, finding the documentary and
testimonial evidence on the record supported the judge's finding that the committees had in
fact acted in a representational capacity. In his concurring opinion, however, Member
Devaney reiterated that he "would require that an employee committee act in a
representative capacity in order to be found a statutory labor organization." Id. at 903 n.11
(Devaney, concurring).
104 Id. at 894.
105 Id.
106 Id. The suggestion box procedure was exempted from the reach of § 2(5) by both
Electromation and DuPont, but the Board's reasons for doing so, as a matter of statutory
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Employee groups that occasionally make ad hoe proposals to management
also seem to be on safe ground, provided that the proposals are not made so
often as to become a "pattern or practice." 107 But on their face, the DuPont
limits-"isolated instances" of groups making "ad hoc proposals"-do not
protect quality circles or quality improvement teams. Groups such as these
exist not only to discuss problems and to develop a number of possible
solutions, but also to apply the knowledge and expertise of their individual
members to arrive at the best solution, one which the group will then propose
to management. 10 8 Because the groups are created specifically to make
proposals to management, they still seem to be prohibited by the law as it
presently stands. 10 9
Section 2(5) does allow employee groups to make some proposals to
management, but the exception is very limited. A quality circle that exists for
the purpose of making proposals to management-and thus deals with the
employer, according to the NLRB's DuPont definition-would not be
considered a labor organization if its proposals do not concern subjects listed in
the section: grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work. But if those terms are construed to have
any breadth at all, virtually any quality circle proposal could "concern" one of
them. 110 The quality circle that proposed the solution would then be a labor
construction, are unclear. Electromation described the procedure as being unilateral, and
thus not a type of dealing. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 n.21 (1992),
enforced, Nos. 92-4129 and 93-1169, 1994 WL 502513 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
However, it is quite possible to imagine a manager discussing a suggestion box proposal
(one that involves a statutory subject such as "conditions of work," as discussed in note 99)
with an employee, sending it back to her for revision, or offering suggestions to improve
the proposal, all of which would be "bilateral" exchanges.
DuPont says that the element of dealing is missing because the suggestion box proposal
is made by an individual, not a group. DuPont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 894. This analysis seems
faulty for the same reason. Nothing in the Board's definition necessarily restricts bilateral
exchanges to those between an employer and a group of employees.
In fact, the decisions should have exempted the suggestion box procedure because it
does not meet the first element of the statutory definition: no "organization" is involved.
107 DuPont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 894. No case law has yet been developed to define the
outer limits of permissible action in this area.
108 See generally BERRY, supra note 28, at 55-74; KATZAN, supra note 26, at 21-87.
109 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
110 For example, crowded conditions in a work area may be the root cause of a quality
problem (perhaps by making it difficult for forklift drivers to deliver materials without
bumping into bins of finished parts and damaging them, thereby increasing scrap or
rework/repair costs). But if open space around one's work station is a condition of work, a
proposal that was intended to solve a quality problem (perhaps by rearranging the shop
layout, or by changing material handling methods) would also run afoul of the words of
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organization.
Moreover, even if management unilaterally delegates authority to a quality
circle to decide on and implement solutions to a limited range of problems
(solutions, perhaps, that would be relatively inexpensive to implement), the
circle's method of operation might get it into trouble. Although unilateral
delegations of authority over conditions of work to groups of employees are
permissible under the Act,"' most quality circles, at least initially, include at
least one supervisor or manager. If the group makes its decisions by majority
vote-and workers make up the majority of the group-there is no dealing in
violation of the Act. 12 But quality circles often make decisions by
consensus, 113 so any member-including the supervisor-has the power to
effectively veto the circle's decision by preventing a consensus from emerging.
Once again, the worker members are put in the position of dealing with a
manager who has the power to accept or reject their proposals-and the circle
thus becomes a statutory labor organization. 114
§ 2(5). See Michigan Note, supra note 11, at 1747 n.65 for a discussion of this point.
11 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
112 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 895 (1993).
113 See BLUESTONE, supra note 19, at 242; KATZAN, supra note 26, at 111-30. The
committees at issue in DuPont operated according to rules of consensus decisionmaking,
which specified that "consensus is reached when all members of the group, including its
leader, are willing to accept a decision." DuPont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 895.
114 See DuPont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 895 (noting that if a manager outside the circle had
the power to reject a proposal, then the circle's act of making a proposal to the manager
would constitute dealing).
Self-directed work groups raise a similar problem. In Electronation, the Board
observed that "an organization whose purpose is limited to performing essentially a
managerial or adjudicative function is not a labor organization under Section 2(5)."
Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 (1992), enforced, Nos. 92-4129 and 93-1169,
1994 WL 502513 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994). Thus, a self-directed work group might be
given the authority to determine its own starting and quitting time, or to resolve grievances
within the group. In General Foods, the employee groups had been given authority to
interview job applicants, inspect the plant and report on safety infractions, and set their own
starting and quitting times. See General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1235 (1977). In
Mercy-Menorial Hospital, a grievance committee composed of four workers and one
manager was empowered to rule upon employee grievances by majority vote. See Mercy-
Memorial Hosp. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1119-20 (1977). Provided the group had the
power to decide these matters for itself, there would be no dealing, and no conflict with the
NLRA. See DuPont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 895.
But if the group must meet with management as part of its decisionmaking process, its
discussions might rise to the level of dealing. See DuPont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 895. For
example, in General Foods, there was one instance in which the self-directed work groups,
as groups, had discussions with management. This event occurred when the groups
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B. The Statutory Subjects of Dealing
Most of the statutory subjects of dealing"15 are more or less self-
explanatory, 116 but the term "conditions of work" 117 requires further
definition. Although the Board has not attempted to provide a single definition
of "conditions of work," recent decisions suggest that the Board may equate
the entire list in section 2(5) with "mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining,""18 a concept developed by the Supreme Court in its interpretation
recommended a holiday schedule change to management. The administrative law judge
thought this was "[t]he closest evidence to [group] dealing," but considered it to be a "de
dnirds and isolated" matter. General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235. Had the groups met
with management more often, the judge's findings may have been different.
115 These subjects are grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
116 As one commentator observed, almost any work problem could be considered a
"grievance." See Michigan Note, supra note 11, at 1747 n.65. Looking to practice as a
guide to interpretation, one finds that most union contracts will define a grievance as a
dispute that relates in some manner to the proper interpretation or application of the
collective bargaining agreement. See Cox, Supra note 10, at 742. Translating this definition
into a nonunion setting, a grievance might arise when a worker and manager have a
disagreement over the existence or application of a work rule or shop practice-over some
element of the "common law of the shop."
117 The original version of the NLRA contained no reference to "conditions of work."
It defined a labor organization as one that dealt "with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages or hours of employment." S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1934),
reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 13, at 2. Introducing this version of the Act, Senator
Wagner characterized the company unions he sought to ban as "agenc[ies] for dealing" with
precisely these subjects. 78 CONG. REC. 3443, reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 13, at 16.
But in the version of the Act adopted the next year, Congress, following the suggestion of
the Secretary of Labor, included the phrase "conditions of work." See STAFF OF SENATE
COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 74TH CONG., 1ST SESS., MEMORANDUM COMPARING S. 1958
WrTH S. 2926, at 9 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 13, at 1331. The
list of subjects in the final version of the Act had apparently been made as broad as possible
in order to reach all company unions. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 534 n.202.
118 The Supreme Court recognized the distinction between mandatory and permissive
subjects of bargaining in NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342,
349-50 (1958).
The distinction is based on the Court's reading of §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA,
which require employers and unions to bargain collectively, and of § 8(d), which defines
collective bargaining as a "mutual obligation ... to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
...." See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3), 158(d) (1988). Those subjects-wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment-are mandatory bargaining subjects,
which either party may insist upon as a condition of agreement. All other subjects (except
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of the NLRA.1 19 Though equating the two may seem to merely trade one list
for another, using the well-established concept of "mandatory subjects" to
define "conditions of work" would give some form to an otherwise amorphous
category. If the Board does interpret section 2(5) in this way, then an employer
could confidently deal with an employee involvement committee over
permissive bargaining subjects without running the risk of committing an unfair
labor practice. 120
those that are illegal) are considered permissive subjects. Permissive subjects may be
discussed by the parties, and may be incorporated in a collective bargaining agreement, but
neither party can insist on a permissive subject or use economic weapons to compel
agreement upon it.
119 The opinions of some individual Board members suggest that the Board is moving
toward this definition of § 2(5) subjects. In his Electromation concurrence, Member Oviatt
drew a distinction between "subject matters about which labor organizations traditionally
bargain," which fall within the § 2(5) definition, and "operational problems such as labor
efficiency and material waste," which do not. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1004
(1992) (Oviatt, concurring), enforced, Nos. 92-4129 and 93-1169, 1994 WL 502513 (7th
Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
Five months later, in Ryder Distribution Resources, Inc., the Board characterized the
last element of § 2(5) as requiring the dealings between the employee group and the
employer to "concern 'conditions of work' or... other statutory subjects of
bargaining.... ." Ryder Distribution Resources, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 814, 817-18 (1993)
(emphasis added). The reference to "statutory subjects of bargaining" might simply seem to
refer to § 2(5) of the NLRA, but § 2(5) does not address bargaining. The statutory subjects
of bargaining are covered in § 8(d) (i.e., mandatory bargaining subjects). See supra note
118 and accompanying text.
Again, in DuPont, the Board's analysis of the unfair labor practice charge hinged in
part upon the finding that the subjects of committee discussion-incentive awards-were
"mandatory subjects ofbargaining" that fell within the § 2(5) definition. See E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 895 (1993) (emphasis added).
Finally, Member Devaney addressed the distinction directly in his concurring opinion
to DuPont, in which he explicitly analyzed the factual situation to determine whether the
employer had dealt with the employee committees over mandatory subjects of bargaining.
Id. at 902 (Devaney, concurring). He returned to this factor in Peninsula General Hospital
Medical Center, noting that the dominated labor organization in that case had largely
concerned itself with mandatory subjects of bargaining. See Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Medical
Ctr., 312 N.L.R.B. 582, 582 n.4 (1993).
120 In an April 15, 1993, memorandum to the NLRB's field offices, the Board's
General Counsel "claimed that it is at least arguable that if the employer deals with a
committee only over permissive subjects of bargaining, the committee may fall outside the
definition of labor organization and, therefore, may be lawful under the Act." NLRB
Official's Memo Warns of Traps in Setting up Involvement Committees, 31 GOV'T EMPLOYEE
REL. REP. 588, 588 (1993).
As in most other areas of labor law, the law distinguishing mandatory from permissive
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As the expert agency in charge of administering the NLRA, the Board is
free to change particular constructions of the Act, and may "take into account
changing industrial realities" when it does. 121 Construing the list of subjects in
section 2(5) as "mandatory subjects of bargaining" would not be inconsistent
with the legislative history of the Act,122 and it would benefit the practice of
employee involvement by drawing a brighter-or at least better established-
line between subjects that employee involvement groups may freely handle and
those over which they must be sure to avoid dealing with management. 123
Moreover, such an interpretation would be consistent with the economic
subjects is quite complex. In very general terms, mandatory subjects of bargaining include
wages, hours, and other "issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the
employer and employees." Allied Chem. and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971). Another verbal formulation of this classification is that
mandatory subjects are those that are "germane 'to the working environment.'" See Ford
Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1988) (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). At the opposite pole,
permissive subjects are those involving managerial decisions "which lie at the core of
entrepreneurial control." Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
121 Electromnation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 992 n.9.
122 The distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects did not exist at the time
the Act was drafted. My point is that the significance of "conditions of work" to the drafters
of § 2(5) is questionable. The original 1934 draft of the NLRA contained no reference to
"conditions of work." See supra note 114. Neither did the first draft of the 1935 version of
the bill. See S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(5) (1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note
13, at 1296. Its inclusion in the final draft of the 1935 bill almost seems to have been an
afterthought. (In this regard, it is significant to note that the version of § 2(5) proposed by
Mr. Charlton Ogbum on behalf of the American Federation of Labor contained no
reference to "conditions of work." See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR,
74TH CONG., 1ST SESS., MEMORANDUM COMPARING S. 1958 wrrH S. 2926, at 10 (Comm.
Print 1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 13, at 1332).
Given the phrase's uncertain importance, limiting its construction to include only
mandatory bargaining subjects does not seem to substantially conflict with the intent of the
Act's drafters, especially when one considers that all the other § 2(5) subjects came to be
considered mandatory subjects after Borg-Warner.
123 This distinction would be beneficial to the practice of employee involvement even
if the Board retains its general prohibition of group proposals to management. Because all
elements of the statutory definition must be satisfied for a group to be a labor organization,
a group could safely make proposals (and thereby deal with management, according to
DuPont) concerning permissive subjects of bargaining. In this connection, it is important to
note that a properly constituted employee involvement group will be tasked with handling
managerial problems, which typically would be considered permissive subjects (that is,
subjects that lie near to "the core of entrepreneurial control"). C. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at
223 (Stewart, I., concurring).
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theory underlying the Act. Most economists treat unions as labor cartels. 124
Following this explanation of the function of unions, Judge Richard Posner has
postulated that the NLRA is a "device for facilitating ... the cartelization of
the labor supply by unions." 125 From this thesis, one can infer that employer
actions that do not interfere with the ability of unions to organize ("cartelize")
workers will not contravene the Act. By pretending to offer some of the
benefits of unionization to workers126 without the costs, 127 company unions
clearly interfere with the unions' organization of the labor force.' 28 That is not
the case when employee groups deal with their employer concerning permissive
bargaining subjects. Although unions are free to discuss such subjects with
willing employers, they cannot use their cartel powers to force agreement. 129
Therefore, when participatory management groups deal with their employers
over permissive subjects, they do not offer competition to the NLRA-
sanctioned labor cartel, since the NLRA has not given the cartel any unique
powers in this area. Because the groups' activities do not conflict with the
underlying purposes of the Act, the Act should not be read to prohibit them. 130
124 See Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 988,
999 (1984).125 Id. at 990.
126 Company unions appear to offer representation, and organized discussions with the
employer, if not bargaining.
127 Being employer sponsored, company unions need charge no dues, and they avoid
the real risk of alienating the employer.
128 See supra part ]I.A; see generally Posner, supra note 124.
129 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
130 This discussion of cartel theory and its implications for interpretation of the NLRA
is necessarily quite terse. For a more complete explanation, see Posner, supra note 124.
A more difficult question would arise if an employer offered to deal with its employees
over permissive bargaining subjects as an explicit alternative to unionization. (Employee
involvement has been used by employers as an anti-union tactic. See BLUESTONE, supra
note 19, at 168). In theory, such an offer could be considered a de facto recognition by the
employer of the nascent employee involvement group as a bargaining representative of the
workers (since the proposal is but a thinly veiled offer to reach a compromise with its
employees, and there is nothing in the law to prevent willing parties from bargaining over
permissive subjects). Cf. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 903 n.12
(1993) (Devaney, concurring) (observing that "tacit recognition of a bargaining agent"
could occur in this way). Although the group may still not meet the statutory definition of a
labor organization, an employer that bargained with a group it established-no matter what
the subject-would surely interfere with the right of its employees to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and thereby commit an unfair labor practice
in violation of § 8(a)(1) of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1988).
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C. The Representation Question
Whether employee involvement groups must be found to act in a
representative capacity before they can be considered labor organizations is a
question of vital importance to the future of the participatory management
movement and perhaps to the future competitiveness of the American
economy. 131 As we have seen, many common forms of participatory
management are designed to harness the creativity and specialized knowledge
of hourly workers and to apply those abilities not just to scattergun problem
solving but to the formation of carefully considered proposals for corporate
action. 132 Under the present interpretation of section 2(5), employee groups
that submit proposals to management deal with their employer and will be
considered statutory labor organizations if their proposals concern "conditions
of work" or other subjects listed in the section. 133 Even if the subject list in
section 2(5) is interpreted to cover only mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, any proposal meant to address a permissive subject may well have
enough of an effect on a mandatory subject to bring the proposal across that ill-
defined line, transforming the group that made the proposal into a statutory
labor organization. 134 Finally, self-directed work groups might also end up
dealing with their employer if their necessary interactions with the employer
rise to the level of "proposals" that occur more frequently than "isolated
instances."1 35
Interpreting section 2(5) to require an employee group to act in a
representative capacity before finding it to be a statutory labor organization
would largely solve these problems. Employee groups could be used to
research managerial problems-ones that pertain to matters such as productivity
and product quality-and submit proposed solutions. They could consider
subjects that have effects on their working conditions-the very matters upon
which their expertise will be most valuable. Self-directed work groups could
freely discuss matters with their managers without running the risk of
establishing a "pattern or practice" of making proposals to management.
At least one commentator has suggested that section 8(a)(2) should be
repealed, believing that the general prohibition of employer interference with
the right of workers to organize themselves and select a bargaining
representative of their own choosing is sufficiently protective of workers'
131 See generally BLUESTONE, supra note 19, at 3-30 (discussing the importance of
employee involvement to the competitiveness of American business).
132 See supra part ll.B.
133 See supra part III.C.
134 See supra part IV.B.
135 See supra part IV.A.
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rights. 136 Whether this contention is true or not, the fact remains that
employers do interfere with attempts by their workers to organize themselves
and have set up in-house labor organizations dressed up as participatory
management programs as a means of forestalling union organizing
campaigns. 137 Because this type of unfair labor practice persists, the section of
the NLRA meant to address it should not be eviscerated. Neither should it be
interpreted so broadly as to chill the development of genuine worker-
management cooperation.
Requiring a showing that the group acted as a representative of other
workers before finding it to be a labor organization would accomplish both
goals. It would be consistent with the original aims of the NLRA as they are
seen both in the legislative history of the Act 138 and in a contemporaneous
study of the phenomenon of company unionism. 139 It would also comport with
the economic theory underlying the Act: groups of employees that do not act in
a representative capacity do not compete with unions for that right, and so do
not pose a threat to the process of labor supply cartelization sanctioned by the
NLRA.140
The representative nature of employee groups could be.objectively tested
by three indicia. 141 First, if an employer bargains with an employee group, the
136 See Shaun G. Clarke, Note, Retlnking the Adversarial Model in Labor Relations:
An Argwnentfor Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 YA L.J. 2021 (1987). The author refers to
§ 8(a)(1), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of" their statutory rights, including the right to
self-organization. See 29 U.S.C. § 157, 158(a)(1) (1988).
137 See, e.g., Ryder Distribution Resources, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 814, 818 (1993); Salt
Lake Div., a Div. of Waste Mgmt. of Utah, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 883, 910 (1993); Research
Fed. Credit Union, 310 N.L.R.B. 56, 65 (1993).
138 See supra part Imf.B.
139 See BUREAU OFLABOR STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 3-4.
14 0 The analysis in Part IV.B pertaining to subjects of bargaining applies with equal
force to the issue of representation.
141 In following the NLRB's doctrinal development in Electromation and DuPont, this
Note has focused upon the dealings between employee groups and management.
Furthermore, this Note presupposes that employee groups are formed by management in
accordance with the management theorists' models discussed in Part I.B. 1.
Questions germane to the representative status of a labor organization could also arise
in the context of the organization's formation. If an organization was formed by the
employees themselves, or staffed with employees elected to their positions, it would be
difficult to find that it "was established ... as an agent of the employer"-and thus was not
a representative of the employees-even if it never discussed subjects such as wages and
benefits with the employer. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. Conversely, an
organization formed by management and staffed with employees selected by management
would objectively be seen as an agent of the employer provided it did not bargain with the
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employer gives it de facto recognition as the bargaining representative of at
least the employees within the group.' 42 While the relationship between
employees and their employer is both adversarial and cooperative, adversarial
matters are properly ones for labor unions to handle. If management bargains
with one of its employee groups-regardless of the subject matter of the
bargaining-the relationship becomes adversarial, and warrants an inference
that the group has begun to act in a representative capacity. Second, discussion
by the employer and the group of matters directly affecting the allocation of
scarce resources (such as hourly wages or benefits) would justify a finding of
representation. These subjects are least likely to concern former management
functions that have been legitimately delegated to a quality circle or quality
improvement team. Moreover, they are subjects upon which workers are most
likely to want union representation because discussion of them would
necessarily be adversarial-resources devoted to wages cannot be used to pay
managers' salaries. Third, as Member Devaney suggested in his
Electromation concurrence, "evidence that a committee was established and
unambiguously served as an agent of the employer [would] be evidence that the
committee lacked a representational purpose."1 43
V. CONCLUSION
The last fifteen years have witnessed developments in worker-management
cooperation unforeseen by the drafters of the NLRA. Because some employers
do attempt to cloak the dominated labor organizations they use to ward off
union organizing efforts in the garb of employee involvement or participatory
management, some company union problems do remain. Fortunately, these
situations are rare. In contrast, large numbers of American businesses-and a
significant number of unions-have experimented with employee involvement,
with positive results in productivity and product or service quality.
Some commentators have concluded that the NLRA will have to be
amended to prevent its anticompany union provisions from crippling this vital
development in cooperative relations. Such action seems premature. The NLRB
has made appreciable progress toward delineating an area under the Act in
which employee involvement groups will be free to operate. In addition, the
employer or discuss matters directly affecting allocation of scarce resources (such as
compensation). In any event, like most questions in labor law, the significance of the
various indicia regarding a group's formation and its interactions with an employer would
have to be weighed on a case-by-case basis.
142 See supra note 130.
143 Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1002 n.20 (1992) (Devaney, concurring),
enforced, Nos. 92-4129 and 93-1169, 1994 WL 502513 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
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Board's recent opinions suggest that when an appropriate case arrives, the
pertinent statutory definition will be interpreted to require that an employee
involvement group act in a representative capacity before it will be found to be
a company-dominated labor organization instead of a legitimate management
tool. This interpretation will permit the NLRA to accommodate today's
economic reality, in which both cooperative and adversarial labor relations
exist.

